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ABSTRACT  
This paper investigates how video game publishers’ choice of game release date is affected by 
the expected level of competition within the game’s product niche. We identify game niches by 
genre, age-appropriateness, a four week window cohort, publisher and console system. Our 
analysis is based on two different video game data sets, one based on industry sales data and 
the other featuring extensive consumer usage information. We show that consumer substitution 
across games is stronger within most of the dimensions describing product niches. Sales 
volumes decay quickly after the opening weekend, so at any point in time, a niche will 
typically be served by few current titles. Thus, publishers have incentives to avoid releasing 
during periods of fierce intra-niche competition. We show that games are more likely to be 
released so as to avoid weeks when their niche is relatively well served.  
 
Keywords: Product Entry, Non-Price Competition, Niche, Strategy, Submarkets, Entertainment 
Goods, Video Games 
JEL Code: D43, L13, L96   
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I. Introduction 
Markets for entertainment goods, e,g, music, movies, books and video games, are often 
characterized by a continuous flow of new product introductions exhibiting considerable 
product differentiation and large differences in realized demand. Sales are largest upon release 
and fall steadily so that individual products tend to have short product lifecycles. A common 
outcome in these contexts is a relative de-emphasis on price competition with more attention to 
matching new product offerings to the heterogeneous tastes of the audience. As the new 
product launch date nears, a firm facing fiercer than expected competition can also adjust the 
product launch date. If product lifecycles are short enough, a delay in the launch date until the 
competitive environment improves may be more attractive than reducing price. We study this 
form of non-price competition based on product launch coordination in the video game 
industry. 
Sales of video games in the US have doubled in the past decade to over $10 billion 
annually, comparable to first-run movie ticket sales. Overall, video games feature many 
characteristics in common with other forms of entertainment such as movies and music. Games 
are characterized by a large degree of product variety in game content along multiple 
dimensions. For example, horizontal differentiation occurs across game genre, gaming 
platform, and the age appropriateness of content. Vertical differentiation occurs as some games 
are generally perceived to be better than others in terms of quality of gameplay, realism of 
graphics and the appeal of the story narrative. Video games face a very short life cycle and a 
rapid decay in sales after the first few weeks after release. Moreover, games depreciate quickly 
as a gamer will often complete a game within a few weeks.1 Demand for game play drops off 
                                                            
1 Recently, games with extensive online multiplayer components may not depreciate as quickly. However, our 
data stems from 2004 to 2009, a time period where, e.g., the well known multiplayer game World of Warcraft just 
started and social features or downloadable content keeping gamers’ interest for longer just beginning to be 
introduced. 
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considerably after completing a game. Accordingly, publishers develop and introduce new 
games frequently in order to stay in the market. Furthermore, gaming often entails a degree of a 
social bandwagon effect in which peers prefer to play and discuss the same games 
simultaneously. This can result in some games becoming “blockbusters” seemingly out of 
proportion to the reported measures of game quality. 
A useful analog for the market for video games is the market for movies (Calantone et 
al. 2010). There is a steady, though seasonal, flow of new product introductions. Sales for an 
individual product are strongest immediately after launch but fall quickly. While larger sales 
typically accompany greater investment in quality, there is still considerable uncertainty about 
an individual product’s profitability even as it is launched.  
The production of video games shares other features with other entertainment goods. 
As with many information goods, they generally exhibit large fixed cost of production and 
small marginal cost of duplication. Publishers can invest more in game production so as to 
develop a game of higher quality in order to increase game demand, however, there remains 
some uncertainty about the eventual perceived quality during the game development stage. 
Because many games place different storylines and action points on top of common computer 
code shared by multiple games, game production can exhibit substantial economies of scope. 
Developers may also have core competencies (e.g., computer code, graphic images, and story 
editors) that are relevant to narrow niches, i.e. specific submarkets, of games (e.g., console 
operating system, age group of audience, and style of play). Finally, advances in the underlying 
computer technology require developers to redesign even core game components from time to 
time. 
Game publishers face a series of strategic decisions at certain junctures. A publisher 
must decide what intellectual property and core competencies to acquire. This could entail, for 
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example, outsourcing a physics engine that governs the movement of virtual objects within the 
games to an independent developer or developing it in-house. The publisher must then decide 
how to exploit these core competencies by choosing which specific product attributes to 
incorporate into a game. This decision is usually associated with choosing a specific horizontal 
niche. Similarly, the publisher must decide where in the quality dimension it wishes to place its 
game. While there is some uncertainty about how a game will ultimately be received, market 
participants know that gamers value higher quality content along a number of related 
dimensions (e.g., graphics, storyline, response time, degree of difficulty, game “balance”, etc.) 
that require greater ex ante investment. Publishers decide whether to vertically integrate into 
game development versus outsourcing it to third-party developers (Gil and Warzynski, 2010). 
Most games are developed by the firm that will eventually publish it. However, the industry 
has seen some degree of vertical disintegration as developers have specialized in specific 
competencies. Once game development is nearer to completion, publishers decide on the extent 
of the marketing campaign to support the game. Until now, publishers have had some degree of 
flexibility to alter the release date but now must lock in a release date to correspond with the 
marketing campaign. A publisher may use current and expected market conditions to choose to 
delay the release of a game so as to avoid release dates when the competition within the game’s 
niche is particularly fierce. Finally, publishers choose the price for the game. Much like movies 
and music, there is much less variation in new game prices than in new game unit sales. 
We focus on the game release date decision and how it is affected by expected 
competition. Since this decision crucially depends on the importance of specific niches in the 
video game market, we identify niches and estimate the degree to which consumers substitute 
across and within niches. These analyses imply that releasing a game in a week when other 
within-niche games are particularly popular can greatly reduce the game’s overall sales. As 
game sales decline quickly with time on the market, delaying the game release date by just a 
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few weeks could greatly increase sales and profits if competitors’ games are already 
depreciated in gamers’ attention.  
Our analysis is based on recent video game sales data consisting mostly of top-selling 
titles from established publishers. The data illustrate that video game publishers are highly 
specialized in each of several different dimensions of product differentiation. For game 
demand we show that consumer substitution across games is stronger within each of these 
dimensions describing niches. Finally, we show that release dates appear to be adjusted so that 
games are released so as to avoid weeks when its niche is relatively well served.  
This paper adds in various ways to the existing literature of new product entry and non-
price competition in markets with short product life cycles. First, we document the importance 
of niches for non-price competition with the incorporation of additional product characteristics, 
such as age appropriateness, genre and console into our model. Second, our use of weekly, 
rather than monthly, sales data better matches the release date strategic decision as video 
games are usually released for the peak weekend demand. Third, by incorporating both supply 
and demand features, we can offer a fuller explanation of various aspects of strategic behavior 
for non-price competition and product introduction timing.  
 
II. Previous Literature 
a. Non-price competition  
Most entertainment goods share a common outcome of much less price variation than would 
seem to be warranted by differences in demand across products. New hit songs from top artists 
can often be downloaded at the same price as niche songs from newcomers. First-run movie 
prices for a blockbuster movie with ticket sales two orders of magnitude greater than a small 
arts film will be within 50% of the arts film. While video games allow for some more complex 
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revenue models, this same pattern holds for them as well.2 Orbach and Einav (2007) explore 
the causes for these uniform prices in the case of movies. Given this uniform pricing, we focus 
on other possible strategic decisions. The key strategic decisions for firms appear to revolve 
around affecting the bundle of product features rather than price. 
Accounting for firms’ non-price activities to increase demand goes back to at least 
Chamberlain (1962). A long line of theoretical literature explores how firms choose multiple 
qualities (Mussa and Rosen 1978) or varieties of a good (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977, Spence 1976) 
to differentiate themselves from one another. Gandhi et al. (2008) analyze the incentives of 
firms after consummate a horizontal merger to respond to the change in competition by 
repositioning their products, as opposed to the usual price adjustments. Industries for which 
non-price competition has been studied include dry cleaners (Plott 1965), airlines (Douglas and 
Miller 1974), hospitals (Joskow 1980) and food retail (Richards and Hamilton 2006). Instead 
of, or in addition to, price this literature highlights the roles of regulation, product quality and 
variety as drivers of demand.  
For entertainment goods, a well-established prominent driver of sales instead of price is 
the perceived quality of each product (Calantone et al. 2010). Sales have been found to be 
related to quality measures derived from expert reviews or consumer ratings for books 
(Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006) or movies (Reinstein and Snyder 2005, Palsson et al. 2013). 
Bounie et al. (2005) and Zhu and Zhang (2010) show that consumer reviews positively 
influence video game purchasing decisions. Such ratings and reviews are valuable pieces of 
information as books, movies, and video games are complex experience goods for which 
consumers cannot know their preferences without consuming. Other suspected drivers of 
                                                            
2 Full price titles from established publishers, often referred to as AAA, are usually priced within the same narrow 
band. An exception is the recent phenomenon of free-to-play games which are often supported by advertising or 
within game purchases. For console games the pricing scheme is even more rigorous as consoles predominately 
feature AAA, full-price titles which are priced similarly across publishers. 
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demand and supply in the video game industry besides perceived quality or pricing are indirect 
network effects (Clements and Ohashi, 2005), installed base Chao and Derdenger, 2013), 
backward compatibility (Claussen et al. 2010) or cannibalization (Grohsjean and Kretschmer 
2008).  
 
b. New Product Entry 
Successful new product introduction has been found to be related to strategic 
interactions between incumbents, the nature of the development process and aspects of the 
market environment such as market potential (Henard and Szymanski 2001; Montoya-Weiss 
and Calantone 1994). In addition Calantone et al. (2010) or Robinson and Fornell (1985), 
among others, also expect the entry timing decision and order of entry to impact new product 
performance. This research sheds light on the risks of pioneering compared to missed 
opportunities of delaying and presents possible strategies on how to improve new product 
performance in both cases (e.g. Rodríguez-Pinto et al. 2011; Vakratsas et al. 2003; Kalyanaram 
and Urban 1992). Early entry may result in access to advantageous market and resources 
(Robinson and Fornell 1985). Late entry, however, can help firms to leapfrog earlier entrants 
with regard to their technological product characteristics (Bayus et al. 1997; Lieberman and 
Montgomery 1998). Cannibalization of firms’ existing products on the market can also drive 
the decision for new product entry (van Heerde et al. 2010; Moorthy and Png 1992) as  firms 
are reluctant to cannibalize their existing success (Grohsjean and Kretschmer 2008) or may use 
cannibalization as a protection mechanism to maintain market leadership (Nault and 
Vandenbosch 1996). The competitive environment in the product’s target market at its launch 
will impact the release date. Currently available products from incumbents and products from 
competitors entering at the same time could substantially reduce new product performance 
(Calantone et al. 2010). With the exception of Calantone et al. (2010), little research has been 
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conducted to explore entry timing decisions of firms trying to avoid such head-to-head 
competition (Krider and Weinberg 1998). Using the movie industry as empirical setting, 
Calantone et al. (2010) show that the performance of a focal product decreases if similar 
incumbent products are available or other new related products enter at the same time. In 
general, the negative impact is bigger for incumbent products than for other new entrants. We 
extend the analysis of Calantone et al. (2010) as we not only confirm their results, showing that 
incumbents’ products indeed decrease new product performance, but also illustrate that 
producers are aware of this competition and try to adjust their product launch timing 
strategically to avoid it. Our analysis is based on the video game industry for which we explore 
several different submarkets (Urban et al. 1984), so-called niches, as strategies are often 
formulated based on the product’s relative categories since these are expected to be the primary 
source of competition (Calantone et al. 2010).  
 
III. Methods  
We employ two separate methodologies that help identify the competitors of a newly 
released video game. First, we develop a model of video game demand based on the product 
characteristics of the game. These include both horizontal product characteristics – console, 
genre, age appropriateness, and cohort – and vertical product differentiation based on game 
quality. As with many entertainment goods, prices at the time of release do not vary across 
games in proportion to demand, if at all. However, as with many entertainment goods, demand 
for an individual game is largely determined by the perceived quality of the game. Thus, our 
model relates the demand for a game both to its own quality as well as the quality of current 
games in the same niche based on observable characteristics. 
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Second, game publishers have an incentive to avoid releasing games concurrent with 
close competitors. As with many entertainment goods, demand is highest during a game’s 
opening week and falls steadily and quickly afterwards. If a strong concurrent competitor will 
decrease opening week demand, the publisher may seek a different release date with fewer 
competitors. We test this by comparing the pattern of releases across weeks for various 
definitions of niches. 
 
A. Video Game Demand 
To identify the importance of niches, we estimate the demand for video games, with 
special attention on measures of product differentiation and the attributes of currently popular 
games. As discussed above, there is little price variation across video games; at most it 
accounts for a small fraction of the variation in demand. Instead, we exploit how game quality 
affects game sales. There is evidence that games of higher perceived quality sell many more 
units, all else equal (Zhu and Zhang, 2010). We exploit the variation in game quality of both 
the focal video game and games likely to be its competitors to identify which characteristics 
lead to substitution across games. 
We relate sales of a game title over time to time on the market, its own quality and the 
quality of currently available games with similar horizontal features. Niche related substitution 
patterns are examined by adding quality measures averaged over the various dimension 
describing the niche the game occupies. To begin with, we include the average quality of all 
other games currently sold. We add additional variables to measure the number and average 
quality of the other games for the same console, in the same genre, granted the same ESRB 
rating, in the same cohort and from the same publisher. This results in the following 
specification: 
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݈݊ሺܳݑܽ݊ݐ݅ݐݕ௜௧ሻ ൌ ߙଵܳݑ݈ܽ௜ ൅ ߙଶܣ݃݁௜௧ ൅ ߛ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߚை௧௛ܳݑ݈ܽ௜௧ை௧௛
൅∑ ߚை௧௛,௡ܳݑ݈ܽ௜௧ை௧௛,௡௡ ൅ ߝ௜௧,
 (1) 
where Qual and Age refer to the focal game and QualOth refers to average quality all other 
current games. The vector X includes various control variables for the year, the week of the 
year, and the day of the week. It also includes dummy variables for the niche the game 
occupies. We hypothesize that ߙଵ is positive and ߙଶ is negative, as indicated in figure 1. 
Indeed, figure 1 suggests that ߙଶ is large in absolute value. 
The additional terms measure competition across games. First, when all other currently 
released games are of higher quality, sales for any one game are smaller. Thus, we hypothesize 
that other current games are substitutes for the current game so that ߚை௧௛ is negative. In 
addition, N indexes the different possible niches: console, genre, ESRB, cohort, and publisher. 
We hypothesize that other current games in the same niche, as defined by these product 
characteristics, are more similar to the game in question and will be closer substitutes. Some 
dimensions of similarity – like console, genre, and ESRB rating – are standardized descriptors 
for video games. Beyond these, we suspect that consumers tend to group together games that 
are released near each other in time. We define four week cohort windows to test for increased 
substitution among these games. Consumers may view their choice set to mainly include games 
that were released concurrently. Finally, games from the same publisher may share common 
characteristics that are not observable to the researcher. The artists who create the music or 
imagery may be the same, they may share the same design philosophy, or they may be part of 
the same character “universe.” To test for these consumer substitution patterns, we construct 
the average quality of games belonging to the same group along each of these five dimensions 
of niches. This implies that the coefficients ߚை௧௛,௡ would also be negative. 
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Our set of control variables, X, includes an extensive set of dummy variables. First, we 
have sets of dummy variables for each niche dimension: the various consoles, genres, ESRB 
ratings, four-week cohort groupings, and the most popular publishers. We model seasonality 
with 52 dummy variables for the weeks of the year of the observation. Video game demand is 
highly seasonal with peak purchasing for the Christmas holiday and peak playing when school 
is out. Finally, we include year dummies as there is a secular increase in video game demand 
over the sample periods. 
The distribution of games across niches and quality level is not likely to be random 
across observations. In fact, we provide evidence below consistent with publishers attempting 
to release games so as to avoid periods with the fiercest competition. Supply side decisions 
such as focusing on non-saturated niches will affect the market composition and may therefore 
lead to biased estimates of our measures of the sources of competition. Unfortunately, we do 
not have an identification strategy to address the possibility that the characteristics of other 
current games may be endogenous to the focal game’s introduction. However, two aspects of 
this market allow us to possibly sign the bias. First, the magnitudes of consumer demand 
parameters are likely to dominate the effects from a non-random composition of competing 
games. Second, we expect that the bias is toward zero implying that our estimates would be 
lower bounds (in absolute terms) for the true parameter (Klepper & Leamer, 1984). This is 
because, if possible, publishers will tend to stagger the releases of close substitutes rather than 
bunch them together in order to avoid periods of fierce competition. This would lead the set of 
current games that the focal game is competing with to be less similar than if they had been 
selected at random. The similarity of products that would remain would be due to the inability 
to perfectly avoid currently saturated niches. This lack of similarity implies that the quality 
levels of the focal game and the other current games occupying its niche will be negatively 
correlated which will tend to bias parameter estimates downward. 
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B. Video Game Entry 
As mentioned above, we expect publishers to attempt to avoid releasing their games 
during periods of the fiercest competition. A game’s peak popularity is almost always the week 
it is released with demand falling quickly over time. This implies that another game in the 
same niche is a greater competitive threat when it is newer than the same game when it is 
older. The substitution away from any individual game would be smaller when the most similar 
games are older. If these substitution effects are large enough, it could be profitable for a 
publisher to delay or expedite the release of game when it anticipates other releases for the 
planned launch week. Indeed, up to a point, it would likely be profitable for publishers to 
coordinate release dates, either explicitly or tacitly, so that potentially competing games’ 
releases are spread out over a year rather than bunched together. One implication of this is that 
the number of releases within a niche in a given week would be negatively correlated with the 
number of popular games in that niche in the previous week. 
We test our hypothesis by relating the number of games released in a niche in a week to 
the degree of competition observed in that niche in the previous week. The measures of the 
degree of competition available are: the number of entrants, the number of game titles, and 
these games’ sales in the previous week. We model the number of releases as a Poisson 
regression equation from a balanced panel of week by niche observations: 
ܧ݊ݐݎݕ௡,௧ ൌ exp൫ߚܥ݋݉݌݁ݐ݅ݐ݅݋݊௡,௧ିଵ ൅ ߛܺ௡,௧ ൅ ߝ௡,௧൯.  (2) 
As the number of releases is a count variable, equation (2) is estimated using the negative 
binomial regression estimator. Models for each niche are estimated separately by creating a 
balanced panel where each niche value and week represents an observation. For example, for 
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age appropriateness, there are four observations in week t, one each for ESRB values of E, 
E10, T and M. Since there are six console categories and eight genre categories, the number of 
observations differs by niche.  
Publishers coordinating on release dates would imply that fewer games will be released 
in a niche in weeks when the previous week saw more games released in that niche so that we 
test whether  < 0. Our controls, X, are related to other factors that may shift the distribution of 
game releases in a week. Some niches are more popular than others necessitating dummy 
variables for each niche. Furthermore, there is evidence that some niches became more or less 
popular over the sample period, especially consoles. To account for this, we also include niche 
by year dummy variables. Finally, because game sales are highly seasonal, we include 52 week 
dummy variables.   
 
IV. Data  
Two separate data sets are used to investigate the nature of competition among video 
games. First, we have constructed a sample based on over one thousand popular console-based 
video games released over a four year period from 2005 through early 2009 from VGChartz.3 
Besides some game characteristics, these data include weekly sales of the top 50 selling, 
predominately AAA, console video games in the US. For each game, we have added 
information regarding its quality from Gamespot,4 a professional video game rating firm whose 
staff reviews each game in our sample, and its rating for age appropriateness from the 
Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB). 5 The second data source comes from users’ 
                                                            
3 See http://www.vgchartz.com  
4 See http://www.gamespot.com  
5 See http://www.esrb.com  
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playing activity within the Raptr6 online platform, a social network site similar to Facebook but 
intended and specialized for video gamers. These are very granular data that, among other 
information, include the gaming sessions played by nearly 200,000 users over a 22 month 
period. We describe all databases in more detail in the following.  
 
A. VGChartz Data 
VGChartz reports weekly unit sales for each of the top 50 selling video console games 
in the US on their website, providing a dataset consisting of 1,192 different titles from 2005 to 
early 2009. The data that were obtained are for games designed for nine different gaming 
consoles. However, the sample contains few games for the consoles Game Boy Advanced, 
GameCube and Xbox as these systems were being replaced by newer systems, so the 42 games 
for these consoles were dropped from the sample. The remaining six consoles in our analysis 
are Nintendo DS, PlayStation 2 and 3, PlayStation Portable, Wii and Xbox 360. Overall, the 
Xbox 360 and Playstation 2 are the most common consoles in our sample,  accounting for 
about 24% and 20% of games surveyed, respectively. 
VGChartz provides the developer and publisher for each game listed. Often these are 
the same firm but even some vertically integrated publishers also publish games developed by 
other firms. We focus on release decisions made by publishers. Considerable effort went into 
determining which studios were subsidiaries of a common publisher resulting in 42 distinct 
publishers. The sample includes some large publishers, such as EA who are responsible for 
more than 200 games in our sample, and smaller publishers such as Valcon or Zoo Games, 
each with one game in the sample.  
                                                            
6 See http://raptr.com 
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The game genre classifications that were obtained from VGChartz were too narrow for 
the type of analysis we intend. Instead, we group the genre information into broader categories 
based on the genre definitions from Gamespot7 as described in Egenfeldt-Nielsen et al. (2008). 
For example, since the sample contains few racing and adventure games, we included racing 
games in the sport category and group adventure games together with role playing games as 
they share similar content. In addition, we include a genre category for music and party games, 
e.g. Guitar Hero, which comprise about one tenth of all games. Nevertheless, classifying games 
in one specific genre is problematic as some games could easily be categorized into two 
different genres, such as Mass Effect which features both action as well as role playing aspects. 
Overall, about 52 percent of the games of our sample include some sort of action, followed by 
sports (28 percent) and role playing games (26 percent). As many games feature an action 
theme as a second genre classification we decided to take the other genre as their main genre 
when forming distinct genre classifications for our estimations.  
The age appropriateness ratings for each game assigned by the ESRB board are E, E10, 
T, M8 where E classifies games suitable for everybody, E10 for everyone aged 10 and up, T for 
teens and M games for a mature audience.9 The ESRB is an industry-supported, non-
governmental body with the goal of providing a simple system to inform parents about the 
content of the games their children may want to play. In this sense, it plays a similar role to the 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) ratings for movies. We identified the ESRB 
ratings for each game in the sample. Overall, categories with the most games are those suitable 
for everybody (33%) or for teen audiences (34%).  
                                                            
7 Overall, there is no standardized principle for defining video game genres making the selection somewhat 
arbitrary. However, Gamespot has developed a broad competence in assessing and valuing video games making 
its genre definition a suitable choice for our data. 
8 Technically there is also a rating of A for adult content only. However, this rating is rarely applied and covers 
mostly games with pornographic content. Our data do not contain games with this rating.  
9 A detailed description of the mechanism determining the assigning of the ratings can be found in Federal Trade 
Commission (2007) or at the ESRB website.  
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Our measure of game quality derives from the expert review data from the GameSpot 
website. Launched in May 1996, GameSpot provides the latest news, reviews, previews and 
links to portals for all current platforms. It also includes a list of the most popular games and 
features a search engine for users to track down games of interest. Almost every game in our 
sample was reviewed by the GameSpot staff who assigns ratings on a scale from 1 to 10. These 
so called GameSpot-Scores (GSS) are intended to provide an at-a-glance sense of the overall 
quality of the game. The overall rating we collected is based on evaluations of graphics, sound, 
gameplay, replay value and reviewer’s tilt. The quality rating of the games can be expected to 
be positively correlated with their sales as better-rated games usually are more highly 
demanded (Zhu and Zhang, 2010). However, it is possible that this relationship differs for 
games based on a popular tie-in from a sequel or a movie, e. g., the Final Fantasy series or the 
Harry Potter franchise. If developers anticipate that these games will sell well due to their 
popular tie-in, they may anticipate lower the returns to investment in game quality. In our 
samples, tie-ins and sequels are rare. The same line of thought might also hold for common 
branding franchises where a game is following a predecessor by, e.g., being the current setting 
of an existing universe or the current season of a professional sport franchise. Our specification 
implicitly assumes that the effects of such branding that carry over to the current game are 
mostly captured by the various niche dummy variables and the measures of quality.  
For each game title, we observe weekly unit sales information so long as the game 
remains in the top 50 sellers. Similar to first-run movies, the week is a natural unit of 
aggregation for the sale of games as they are typically released for more intensive weekend 
play. We observe more weeks of data for more popular games that remain among the top 50 
sellers for longer. On average, we observe 10 weeks of sales data per game, but there is 
considerable variation. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of weeks in the top 50 for our data. 
Almost all video games in our sample exhibit a strong decline in sales after its release date. 
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Figure 2 depicts this decline for the average game. Finally, there is considerable variation in 
the popularity of different game titles. Figure 3 depicts the distribution of the natural logarithm 
of unit sales for the initial week after the game’s release. 
 
B. Raptr Data 
We obtained user data from the Raptr platform for the period from January 2010 to 
November 2011 for 195,337 distinct users. Raptr is the leading online social network 
community for gamers with up to 17 million users currently. It offers gamers several services 
that are available in-game, on the web, and on mobile devices. Each Raptr user’s console or PC 
is linked to the Raptr client with the user receiving an individual profile in the social network 
that tracks all his gameplay activity for each individual game. Users can link to each other – 
“friend” each other – to communicate within a common social circle. Raptr offers a condensed, 
personalized news feed aggregating interesting discussions, news, videos, screenshots, and 
strategy guides based on the games the user, or his linked social circle, are currently playing. 
The Raptr client provides useful in-game features to gamers such as cross-platform IM chat, 
web surfing, access to popular social media services as well as video and screenshot capturing 
that all facilitate the coordination of gameplay. In our overall data we observe 37 million 
gaming sessions by 195,337 distinct users.  
Several different pieces of information are available for each gaming activity. Most 
importantly, for each session we observe the game title. Within the time period for which we 
have Raptr data, we examine the 363 games that had 500 or more user-specific gaming 
sessions. The games featured in RAPTR are either based on the PC (34.3%) or Xbox (65.6%) 
as the RAPTR client was only able to track these two platforms during this time period. More 
than 95 percent of these games are full price AAA titles making the RAPTR data highly 
comparable to the aforementioned VGChartz data.  
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For each game and for each day, we can aggregate the total duration of time spent 
playing the game across all users. For each game, we obtained information on the game’s 
release date, genre, ESRB rating, and gaming console. We used metacritic data for our measure 
of game quality. 10 Metacritic aggregates reviews across multiple reviewers for entertainment 
goods such as movies, games, television, and music. Most popular games are reviewed by 
multiple but not always the same critics. Because critics can have idiosyncratic biases, our 
measure is the average score after netting out a critic’s individual fixed effect and normalizing 
by the critic’s individual standard deviation in scores. 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis and Results 
Our data allow us to generate measures of horizontal differentiation (console, genre, 
ESRB rating, cohort, publisher) and vertical differentiation (Gamespot or Metacritic score). 
These allow us to define niches and measure within and across niche substitutability. 
Furthermore, during any week (VGChartz) or day (RAPTR), we can use VGChartz sales data 
as well as number of adopters and accumulated play time reported by RAPTR to measure how 
well the industry and each publisher are serving each niche. We link this niche level sales 
information to a multi-dimensional state variable and conjecture that publishers respond to the 
current values of this state variable.  
First, we estimate a video game demand function that provides evidence of greater 
substitution across games within similar product attributes defined along these dimensions. 
Having established that video game niches are important, we then estimate a hazard function 
for time between a publisher’s game releases to show that publishers tend to alter the release 
date of games to avoid periods when the game’s niche is already saturated with popular games. 
                                                            
10 http://www.metacritic.com/ 
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A. Consumer Substitution Across Games 
Table 3 reports the results of various specifications of our estimation of equation (1) 
using the VGChartz data. Each observation represents the weekly unit sales of a game so long 
as it remained among the top 50 sellers that week. Because the sample includes only top 50 
games, the distribution of error terms is truncated so that values that would imply sales below 
the minimum value for a week are not possible. We therefore adopt a maximum likelihood 
estimator that truncates the error distribution at the minimum sales value for the week. As 
expected, the truncation parameter is estimated to be significantly different from zero in all our 
specifications indicating that a non-truncated normal distribution assumption would be 
inappropriate.  
Video games exhibit strong seasonality, especially around the Christmas gift giving 
season. Accordingly, as outlined in section III, we account for seasonality in all specifications 
with 52 week-of-year dummies. Since the data span more than four years which were affected 
by macroeconomic shocks, we also include year dummies. Finally, since our substitution 
variables are interactions with the different dimensions describing a niche, we include sets of 
dummy variables for each of the niche dimensions: six for console, eight for genre, four for 
ESRB rating, eight for cohort, and eight for major publisher.  
We begin with the most basic specification and then introduce regressors that better 
uncover niche substitution behavior. In column 1, the only time varying regressors are the 
game’s GameSpot score and its age in weeks. With children’s games being not as time 
sensitive we include separate age variables for games with an ESRB rating of “E” or “E+” 
versus those rated “T” or “M.” As expected, sales are higher for games deemed to be of higher 
quality and are lower in games’ age, especially for those not directed toward small children. 
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Column 2 adds the average GameSpot score for all other games over that week’s top 50 sellers. 
Consistent with competitive pressures, game sales are significantly lower when other 
concurrent games are of higher quality. These effects are large. An increase by one standard 
deviation in own and other GameSpot scores, 1.26 and 0.22 respectively, imply a 52% increase 
and a 38% decrease in sales respectively.  
Next we investigate whether within niche substitution is stronger compared to between 
niche substitution. Column 3 introduces the variables that average GameSpot scores only for 
games in the same niche as the dependent variable for each dimension of possible horizontal 
differentiation: console, genre, ESRB, cohort, and publisher. First, we find that the effect of all 
other games is no longer significantly different from zero. This suggests that not all other 
games are of equal substitutability. The games in the same niche exert more competitive 
pressure than the average game. Second, the estimates for the niche parameters are all negative 
but only those for console and cohort are significantly different from zero at the 5% level, 
while those for genre and ESRB rating are significant at the 10% level. Those from the same 
publisher have a negligible effect, possibly because the publisher has more discretion over the 
release date of potentially cannibalizing games. The magnitudes of these effects can be gauged 
by calculating the effect of a one standard deviation increase in each variable. These are as 
follows: console -8.9%, genre -13.9%, ESRB rating -30.8%, cohort -16.6% and publisher -
1.9%. If a game was unlucky enough to have a one standard deviation higher quality level in 
all competing niche dimensions simultaneously, demand is estimated to be 72% lower. This 
would be a large effect on demand and would substantially decrease profitability. 
We re-estimate equation (1) using the daily Raptr data. Since these data include all 
games played and not just the top 50, we use a standard OLS estimator. However, these data 
allow us to identify both purchase behavior with the number of gamers who first begin playing 
a game and consumption behavior with the number of hours played. For the games in this 
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sample, our measure of quality is from the standardized Metacritic score as described above. 
As these data are daily, we add day-of-week dummies to the set of control variables. Also, 
because the usage data are affected by new users joining the Raptr network, we include 
dummies for each of the 94 weeks. As before, dummy variables are included for each of the 
values of the niche dimensions. 
Table 4 reports estimation results. As with the VGChartz results, columns (1) and (4) 
indicate that game quality and age greatly affect video game purchases and consumption. 
Likewise, columns (2) and (5) introduce the average quality of all other currently played games 
and are estimated to be negative. Since the Metacritic and Gamespot scores are on different 
scales, the coefficients are not directly comparable to those in table (3). However, a one 
standard deviation in own and all other Metacritic scores are estimated to imply a change in 
adoptions of 41% and -16% respectively, somewhat smaller effects than estimated with the 
VGChartz data. 
Finally, columns (3) and (6) include quality variables for each of the niche variables as 
well as the quality variable for all other games. As before, the estimated coefficient on the 
quality of all other games is smaller in absolute terms when the niche variables are included in 
the specification. In fact, now they become positive and significant suggesting that games are 
complements with games in other niches. As before, the niche variables tend to be negative. 
The exceptions are the genre niche which is positive and significant but small in magnitude, 
and ESRB rating which is not significant for adoptions. A one standard deviation increase in 
the average quality along each niche dimension leads to a change in adoption of -44.4% for 
consoles, +1.9% for genres, -0.7% for ESRB rating, -8.2% for cohort and -11.4% for 
publishers. A one standard deviation increase in all dimensions simultaneously would decrease 
sales by -62.8% without including the effect from all other games and -47.7% once this effect 
is netted out. 
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The two datasets used in our empirical analysis offer qualitatively similar results. In 
both cases, a large amount of the variation in game sales is due to game quality. In both cases, 
game sales fall quickly, between 8.5 and 9.8% per week, and game sales are substantially 
lower when the overall quality of the other currently available games is higher. Finally, in both 
cases, the quality of other games with similar product characteristics has an even larger effect 
on the focal game’s sales. There are some differences in the estimated magnitudes of the 
effects for different niche dimensions. This could be because they represent different sets of 
games and users. However, it appears that the important dimensions are console, genre and 
cohort with less support for age appropriateness and a common publisher. Taken together, this 
evidence indicates that there is substantial substitutability across the games currently available 
to consumers. A publisher releasing a game during a period in which many high quality games 
are already available will face depressed sales. Moreover, if these other games share features in 
common with the newly released games, sales are decreased even further.  
We can use these estimates to get some idea of the value of avoiding such weeks in 
which many high quality games already compete. Let us suppose that, in the week of a planned 
game release, the average Gamespot score for other games is one standard deviation, 0.22, 
higher than average. If a publisher could delay the release one week, how much would the 
VGChartz estimates imply that this game’s sales would increase? Over time, the higher quality, 
currently available games will be replaced with games of average quality implying that the 
quality of competing games regresses towards the mean level of quality. On average, 4.52 new 
games enter and exit the top 50 every week. If the new games were drawn from the set of all 
games and replaced games drawn from the current top 50 games, then their average Gamespot 
score would be expected to fall in subsequent weeks by 0.020, 0.039, 0.055, etc. as more of the 
high quality games are replaced by typical games.  
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Based on the coefficient estimate of -1.720 from column 2 of table 3 the expected 
decrease in Gamespot score of all other games leads to increased sales of 3.5%, 6.7%, 9.5%, 
etc. in subsequent weeks, reaching out to 25% higher ten weeks later. While typical games 
replacing better games would occur regardless of a publisher’s entry decision, delaying the 
game release one week would imply that these relative increases in sales would occur sooner 
within the product’s lifecycle. By delaying one week, sales could increase by about 9% on 
average over the first ten weeks after release. A similar calculation assuming the quality in 
each niche dimension was one standard deviation above the mean implies about a 17% increase 
in sales over the first ten weeks from delaying game release by one week.  
The above calculation suggests a substantial increase in profits from delaying entry by 
just one week in these circumstances. These could be overestimates because fewer of these 
highly rated games are likely to drop from the top 50 in any week, because a delayed game 
may not sell as well, and because there could be some additional marketing expenses 
associated with the delay. Nevertheless, these additional factors are likely more than offset by a 
17% increase in sales over the game’s first 10 weeks. Indeed, this makes clear how delaying 
the game’s release could be a more important strategic decision than, say, reducing price. 
 
B. Entry Decisions to Avoid Saturated Niches 
The above analysis demonstrates the importance of substitutability across games. It also 
suggests that substitution may be larger within product niches and indicates which of the niche 
dimensions generate more substitutability than others. Any specific firm will have a 
comparative advantage in a subset of possible product characteristics. Consumers typically 
substitute mainly within a subset of product characteristics. Moreover, since the sales of the 
typical game decay quickly, around 8% per week, the viable lifecycle of a typical game, once 
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launched, is short. The above analysis also indicates a potentially substantial return to timing a 
game’s release so as to avoid periods in which a game’s niche is already saturated. Here we 
report results of our test of game release date timing to avoid competition. 
We hypothesize that in the weeks, and perhaps months, prior to game release, 
publishers become aware of the expected release dates of competitors. Given the rapid 
expected decay in sales, they attempt to adjust their game release date so as to avoid periods 
with the fiercest competition. As a proposed launch date nears, the information about the 
quality of these expected releases becomes more firm. At this time, it may become even more 
imperative to adjust the product launch. 
The results of the entry regressions based on equation (2) from the VGChartz data are 
reported in table 5. The first panel, for console niches, reports different specifications of a 
Poisson regression of the number of entrants in a console type in a week as a function of the 
degree of competition in the previous week. All specifications include dummy variables as 
controls for year, week-of-year, console as well as console by year interactions as outlined in 
section III.11 The three measures of competition in the previous week are: the number of games 
launched in the previous week for the same console, the number of titles within the top 50 
games for the same console, and the unit sales of games for the same console in the previous 
week. In all cases, the coefficient estimate on our competition measure is negative as 
hypothesized, but it is only significantly different from zero for unit sales. The other two panels 
repeat the analysis for genre and ESRB rating. Again, all coefficients of interest take on the 
hypothesized negative value and six out of nine are significantly different from zero. Note that 
the strongest results here are for the Genre and ESRB product quality dimensions. These are 
the characteristics with the largest coefficient magnitudes in sales demand estimates from table 
3.  
                                                            
11 This last set of dummies is meant to control for the changing popularity of consoles over the time period. 
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For completeness, we repeat the analysis using the Raptr data. In this case, we estimate 
negative coefficients for the variables of interest in five out of six specifications; however, 
none are near to being significantly different from zero at conventional confidence intervals. 
With these data, however, we observe many fewer weeks making our sample size much 
smaller. During these weeks, we observe only one-third as many entry events as we do with the 
VGChartz data. In addition, we lose degrees of freedom trying to model the growth in 
popularity in the Raptr network independently of the growth in popularity of video games. To 
do this, we include separate dummies for each week rather than week-of-year and year 
dummies. In light of this, it may not be surprising that the coefficients on competition are not 
statistically different from zero. Still, we consider the results from the VGChartz data as 
supportive of the hypothesis that publishers coordinate video game release dates.  
 
V. Conclusion  
While the video game industry is rapidly growing in importance, it is only beginning to 
be studied academically. It shares a number of features with other entertainment goods like 
movies, music, and books. There is a steady stream of new products. There are substantial 
upfront costs in production. Consumers have strong preferences for new releases and 
consumers have heterogeneous preferences for highly differentiated products. Within this 
context, one of the many strategic choices publishers must make is when to release a game. 
We demonstrate the importance of product niches to understanding outcomes in this 
industry. We also suggest that the form of competition revolves around the characteristics 
embodied in the games rather than on the prices. This information indicates that the release 
date decision could have large profit implications depending on the level of competition in the 
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publisher’s product niche. Our results suggest that firms adjust their release dates so as to avoid 
periods of fiercest competition.  
It is possible that consumers of entertainment goods will benefit from coordination on 
release dates. In contrast, consumers are almost certainly harmed by firms coordinating on 
price. Consumers could benefit from release coordination if it serves to smooth the flow of new 
product introductions within niches. Otherwise, heterogeneous consumers may experience 
peaks and valleys in the flow of their preferred niches of products. During valleys, they may 
have to resort to playing either inferior games from other niches or older games that have 
depreciated already. Release date coordination dampens the size of these peaks and valleys. 
Modeling this would require explicit accounting for the form of consumer heterogeneity and is 
suggested for possible future research. 
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Figure 3 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for VGChatz Consumer Substitution Sample 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Sales 38,523 76,825 
ln(Sales) 10.00 0.95 
Game Age in weeks (E or E+) 13.64 22.51 
Game Age in weeks (T or M) 7.63 15.35 
Gamespot Score (GSS) 7.71 1.25 
Gamespot Score (GSS) for All Other Games 7.75 0.22 
GSS for games with same Console 7.33 0.87 
GSS for games with same Genre 7.42 1.04 
GSS for games with same ESRB 7.33 0.94 
GSS for games with same Cohort 10.53 6.79 
GSS for games with same Publisher 2.71 3.98 
Based on the 9,026 game by week observations for the 1,024 games 
over 227 weeks included in the demand estimation. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for Raptr Consumer Substitution Sample 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Adopters 18.42 109.98 
Hours of Play 18,400 111,995 
Ln(Aadopters) 1.91 1.22 
Ln(Hours of Play) 7.51 2.05 
Game Age in Days 86.12 51.77 
Metacritic Score (Quality) 74.93 12.39 
Quality all Other Games 75.81 1.01 
Quality for Games with Same Console 76.09 1.03 
Quality for Games with Same Genre 76.65 2.09 
Quality for Games with Same ESRB Rating 75.86 2.32 
Quality for Games with Same Cohort 74.49 3.91 
Quality for Games with Same Publisher 76.20 5.44 
Based on the 33,713 game by day observations for the 361 games 
over 94 weeks included in the demand estimation. 
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Table 3. Video Game Unit Sales Demand Estimates from VGChartz 
 Ln(Unit Sales) 
Gamespot Score 
   (Quality) 
0.375*** 0.420*** 0.471*** 
(0.097) (0.100) (0.106) 
Game Age in weeks 
   (E or E+ ESRB) 
-0.007 -0.006 -0.004 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Game Age in weeks 
   (T or M ESRB) 
-0.082*** -0.084*** -0.084*** 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Quality for all other 
   games 
-1.720*** -0.448 
(0.361) (0.350) 
Same Console 
   Quality 
-0.096** 
(0.041) 
Same Genre 
   Quality 
-0.118* 
(0.069) 
Same ESRB  
   Quality 
-0.123* 
(0.067) 
Same Cohort 
   Quality 
-0.254*** 
(0.090) 
Same Publisher 
   Quality 
-0.005 
(0.069) 
Dummies for:  
   Console X X X 
   Genre X X X 
   ESRB rating X X X 
   Cohort X X X 
   Publisher X X X 
   Day-of-Week X X X 
   Week X X X 
Observations 9,296 9,296 9,271 
Estimates from ML where distribution of errors is 
truncated at the sales of that week’s minimum sales. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Video Game Demand Estimates from Raptr 
 Ln(Number of Adopters) Ln(Duration of Play) 
Metacritic 
   Score 
0.034*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.073*** 0.071*** 0.074*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Game Age in 
   days 
-0.017*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.018*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Quality for all 
  other Games 
-0.161*** 0.150***  -0.322*** 0.475*** 
(0.032) (0.043)  (0.055) (0.077) 
Same Console 
  Quality 
-0.430***   -0.929*** 
(0.027)   (0.055) 
Same Genre 
  Quality 
0.009**   0.027*** 
(0.004)   (0.006) 
Same ESRB 
  Quality 
-0.003   -0.051*** 
(0.004)   (0.007) 
Same Cohort 
  Quality 
-0.021***   -0.018*** 
(0.001)   (0.002) 
Same Publish. 
  Quality 
-0.021***   -0.014*** 
(0.002)   (0.003) 
Dummies for:    
   Console X X X X X X 
   Genre X X X X X X 
   ESRB rating X X X X X X 
   Cohort X X X X X X 
   Publisher X X X X X X 
   Week X X X X X X 
Observations 36,292 36,292 35,387 34,547 34,547 33,713 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Poisson regression of number of entrants in a niche from VGChartz over 225 w eeks 
Console Genre ESRB 
Number of Entrants 
   Previous Week 
-0.072 -0.072*** -0.055** 
(0.050) (0.027) (0.022) 
Number of Titles 
   Previous Week 
-0.014 -0.058*** -0.002 
(0.021) (0.015) (0.011) 
Unit Sales 
   Previous Week 
-0.739** -0.344** -0.568***
(0.321) (0.150) (0.137) 
Dummies for: 
   Week X X X X X X X X X 
   Year X X X X X X X X X 
   Niche X X X X X X X X X 
   Niche×Year X X X X X X X X X 
Observations 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,800 1,800 1,800 900 900 900 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Poisson regression of number of entrants in a niche from RAPTR over 94 weeks 
Console Genre ESRB 
Number of Entrants 
   Previous Weeks 
-0.004 -0.010 -0.123 
(0.069) (0.070) (0.099) 
Number of Game Adopters 
   Previous Week 
0.263 -0.127 -0.210 
(1.364) (0.943) (1.094) 
Dummies for: 
   Week X X X X X X 
   Niche X X X X X X 
Observations 376 376 564 564 470 470 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
